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SUMARY REPORT
A. Introduction
This study is concerned with the possibilities, limitations, and
prospects of arms control and disarmament for three major underdeveloped
areas of the world--Latin America, the Middle East, and Africal-focussing
both on arms control measures that might commend themselves to the
countries in these areas as being in their own best interest, and those
that in our judgment might profitably be initiated or supported by the
United States Government.
It is our basic conclusion that the goal of finding better ways
to restrict the arms competitions that exist or are about to start in
the regions in question belongs very high in the hierarchy of U.S.
strategic and foreign policy interests.
We would not rate this interest as high as the U.S. interest in
deterring the Soviet Union, or in containing Communist China, or in
keeping the areas in question from being absorbed by either of the
Communist empires. Neither would we rate it as high as the U.S.
interest in finding ways to moderate the larger nuclear arms race.
But we would rate it alongside the extremely potent U.S. interest in
the successful transition of the developing countries into stable and
viable societies; and we would assert that the latter objective is
probably unattainable if arms competitions swallow up the precious
margin of resources needed for development that so many of them still
lack.
We would also rate it as a vital part of the high U.S. interest
in reducing the capacity of secondary disputes to erupt into great
power war. It should not be forgotten that the more stable the
strategic balance in great power relations, the greater the temptation
for one of the superpowers to engage in competitive military assistance
in areas adjacent to the zones of dominant influence of the other.
Thus the potential for intensified arms competition in the developing
areas may be growing. A vigorous arms control policy may be necessary
in order not to lose ground,
1This study as originally commissioned did not include possible
regional arms control arrangements for the developing countries of Asin
Many of the comments and recommendations in this summary report may
be applicable to Asian countries as well, although a detailed analysis
of specifically Asian problems would doubtless yield a different set of
specific proposals.
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It scarcely needs saying that no arms control or disarmament scheme
can be expected to materialize in a region, however much the United States
may want it, if it is not clearly in the interests of the preponderance
of countries in the region. Arms control measures for these reasons may
not be possible; they may be extraordinarily difficult to bring about;
they may in all events be drastically limited in scope. But their chief
meaning is that, in the amorarium of policy measures the United States
needs to contemplate to fulfill its interests in both development and
stability in these regions, disarming and arms-controlling measures
have a serious operational place alongside other basic means of policy,
whether economic, political, or military.
B. Latin America
1. Political and Strategic Basis for Arms Control
Armed forces are needed in Latin America principally for the purpose
of maintaining law and order and inorder to deter and eliminate armed
subversion. There is little objectivc military need for any Latin Amer-
ican state to acquire a military capacity for defense against other
states in the region, or for defending the region as a whole against
attack. The chief intra-hemispheric threat to security--Castro's Cuba--
should continue to be contained as a direct military menace so long as
U.S. guarantees, reinforced by both inter-American and universal
collective security agreements, remain unambiguous; the indirect threat
of Castro-supported subversion, however, is another matter.
The present organization, equipment, doctrine, and self-image of
the Latin American armed forces emphasize classical conventional military
preparedness. Restructuring these forces to internal security require-
ments would result in all countries in scrapping useless and costly
"prestige" armaments, and in some countries in a reduction of manpower.
Building competent internal security forces in addition to existing
forces, rather than converting the latter to new tasks, would consti-
tute a severe and unnecessary economic drain. While present military
budgets are neither crushing nor spiraling, they are an important
economic burden and are larger than the international climate seems
to justify.
In nearly all countries in the region, the military establishment
is an important element in the domestic political process. The circum-
stances of their intervention in that process differ from country to
country, and on occasion it makes a valuable contribution to U.S. goals.
Generally speaking, however, it is in the U.S. interest that stable,
competent, and responsible civilian political institutions have an
opportunity to develop free from constant threat of barracks revolt
and military adventurers. The primary obstacles to any arms control
agreements in Latin America grow out of internal rather than international
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factors. For the most part, anti-Communist, reform-oriented political
groups would favor the allocation of fewer resources to the armed forces;
the major group in opposition would be the military establishment.
U.S. military security interests would on balance certainly not
be hampered by a program of regulation and limitation of arms and armed
forces in Latin America; U.S. political interests would benefit by the
continued existence at low levels of both.
2. Recommended Action
a. Indigenous Agreements. It would be desirable if a scheme for
arms limitation and regulation were to be formulated by Latin American
governments, whether through OAS or in an ad hoc forum, developed either
comprehensively or on a step-by-step basis, and consisting of the follow-
ing principal elements:
(1) Formal renunciation by the countries of Latin America of
the right to manufacture, receive, or include among national armaments
nuclear weapons, CBR weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction.,
along the lines of the Five-Presidents' Declaration of April 29, 1963
(by which governments would commit themselves not to manufacture,
receive, store, or test nuclear weapons or devices to launch them).
However, the United States should not favor any arrangement that in
principle affected the right to use nuclear weapons if that ever
became necessary, or the right of transit or deployment of U.S.
weapons, and in this sense the proposal differs from the usual
tnuclear-free" zones notion.
(2) Prohibition by the countries of Latin America of all
forms of conventional weapons systems commonly considered to be
sophisticated and/or offensive in nature, and irrelevant to their
internal security needs. Admittedly different situations involve
different security requirements. But examples of prohibited
weapons might include: medium, intermediate, and long-range
missiles with precision guidance, whether surface-to-air, surface-
to-surface, or air-to-surface; jet-powered aircraft other than
fighters; heavy tanks; mobile artillery; large warships such as
aircraft carriers and cruisers; and submarines.
(3) Quantitative limits set on other primarily defensive
weapons, military aircraft, and naval vessels. Again, the question
of permitted weapons with particular relevance to internal security
requirements might include: small arms and ammunition; personnel
carriers; light machine guns; tear gas and other crowd-control
equipment; trucks and light tanks; small coastal and river defense
craft; helicopters; and light military aircraft for transport and
surveillance.
(4) Arms limitations based on the recognition that for most
Latin American countries the armed forces are to be used primarily
to meet internal security needs. Under this policy a few states
would be required to reduce their forces to agreed levels, and
virtually all would need to restructure their armed forces to fulfill
this function; in addition, there would be some retention of both
surplus equipment and trained military reserves for collective
security purposes under OAS and/or the United Nations.1
(5) The signatories to agree not to acquire additional arms
production capacity either by new construction or conversion.
(6) Agreements to reduce military budgets and to exchange
military information in order to reduce the chances of arms competition
based on miscalculation, as well as to promote a climate of greater
mutual confidence.
(7) Agreement to demilitarize inter-nation frontiers in the
region.
(8) The creation of an Arms Control Inspectorate, perhaps
comparable to that of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments,
to perform minimum necessary inspection functions.
(9) The countries in Central America to be encouraged to
explore the possibility of sub-regional agreements that might go
beyond the present measures, or be administered separately.
b. United States Policy
(1) The United States should encourage Latin American
countries to seek a comprehensive agreement along these lines. U.S.
initiative might be in the context of a larger scheme for reducing
armaments and regulating the arms trade in the world at large; but as
indicated above, the initiative for a specific regional agreement
should come from Latin America.
(2) In the U.S. military assistance program for Latin
America--the so-called Alliance for Progress Security Programow
prime emphasis is correctly placed on internal security needs.
1There is need for development of better objective criteria
than we now possess for military, para-military, and police forces
appropriate and necessary for internal security purposes in various
classes of situations--criteria that can be applied to concrete
policy problems with some level of consistency and reliability with
special attention to the distinctions between counterinsurgency,
guerrilla warfare, and other "sublimited" military requirements.
It is simply not good enough to say that every case is different,
and our own analysis suffers from the absence of such benchmarks.
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The remainder should be closely reviewed to conform it to the
requirements of arms control as outlined earlier. U.S. influence
with Latin American military officers should be used to promote a
climate favorable to arms control.
(3) The continued availability of United States power at the
service of OAS and the United Nations in the event of overt acts of
aggression should be continuously emphasized to Latin America,
specifically with regard to any acts sponsored or initiated by extra-
hemispheric powers and/or Cuba.
(4) Any agreement among the nuclear powers to prevent the
introduction of nuclear weapons or their components into the
developing areas (as suggested below for the Middle East) should,
of course, be applied to Latin America as well.
C. The Middle East
1. Political and Strategic Basis for Arms Control
The Arab countries of the Middle East arm for three purposes:
for internal security, against Israel, and against each other. Israel
arms against possible Arab attack. The Western-allied countries,
Turkey and Iran, have rather different security problems that are
directly related to the Cold War; they are consequently excluded from
the proposals for the Middle East summarized below. However, they
also have significant problems of internal security.
The Arab-Israeli enmity clearly dominates the security situation
in the Middle East, from the standpoint of both regional and possibly
world peace. The spiraling arms competition between Egypt and Israel,
now involving missiles and perhaps soon nuclear weapons, is probably
the only genuine "arms race" in the several regions covered in this
study. The competition is essentially futile, since the relative
power positions of the adversaries remain little changed; yet if
present trends continue, escalation of the race is inevitable, with
unpredictable consequences. In the Middle East as a whole, the cost
of arms has risen to the arresting figure of $1 billion in 1963,
constituting not only a potential challenge to the peace but also
a present obstacle to economic growth.
1Cyprus has not been included in this study of arms control in
the Middle East because, at the time the study was begun, Cyprus was
not primarily oriented toward that region. However, its Middle Eastern
ties appear to be increasing and it should probably be included in any
further analysis of this problem.
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In the face of the Arab-Israeli struggle, there is virtually no
prospect for any form of area arms control or disarmament initiative from
within the Middle East. Measures that are for any reason desirable and
feasible must therefore be initiated and carried out from the outside.
In specific terms, they might take the shape of agreement among
external suppliers of arms and military materiel. Since the United
States and the Soviet Union, while not necessarily the principal
suppliers, are the chief competitors, a d4tente between them sufficient
for such an agreement is a prime precondition for any significant arms
control in the Middle East.
Although initiatives from within the Middle East are not to be
expected, there are several reasons why certain limited externally-
initiated and carried out arms control measures would be in order, and
possibly even accepted- -perhaps even secretly welcomed--in the area
despite the unpromising environment. Foremost among these are the
futility, cost, and increasing danger of the Arab-Israeli arms race.
The average citizen might conceivably be as responsive to propaganda
for internal and regional peace and progress as he would be for holy
wars, forcible unification of the Arab world, or irredentist movements.
U.S. interests in the Middle East, like those in Latin America,
call for defending the region against aggression from the outside and
preserving as much stability as possible within. It is our appraisal
that from the strategic standpoint the Middle East is well worth
defending. But in the case of internal disorders there, unless they
threaten to upset world peace, the United States is not as concerned
with local outcomes and has no truly vital interest at stake apart
from the prevention of escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
This interest reflects the broader U.S. interest in stability which
in turn urgently calls for measures to stop the spiraling arms race
in this area.
2. Recommended Action
a. Western-Allied States. Our analysis reveals no alternative
for Iran and Turkey, outside of a generalized world-wide disarmament
scheme, other than continued reliance on U.S. power, and continued
inclusion in the "Forward Defense" category of U.S. military assist-
ance. No specific regional measures of arms control or disarmament are
proposed for these two countries (although the inclusion of Iran in
a broader disarmament scheme is not ruled out under changed
conditions).
b. Arab Middle East and Israel
(1) The principal measures proposed are: joint U.S.-Soviet
action to preclude the escalation of the UAR-Israeli arms race to
nuclear weapons, and toward the further end of a freeze at current
levels of the weaponry and force levels of the principal adversaries
in the region.
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If limited to the Arab-Israeli area, the first measure could
take the form of a joint declaration by the United States, Soviet
Union, United Kingdom, and France pledging not to take any action to
encourage or aid, and to take any action necessary to prevent, the
introduction of nuclear weapons or their essential components into
the area. It would be accompanied by assurances to the states of
support for peaceful programs, and appropriate minimal controls through
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These measures alone
would not prevent a determined effort in, for instance, Israel to
produce a crude but deliverable nuclear weapon. The means of pre-
vention, short of a universally enforceable disarmament program,
would consist of a combination of the external ban on introduction
from the outside; IAEA inspection of power and research reactors;
the ban on weapons testing; and, perhaps most important of all, a
solid guarantee by the United States, alone or in conjunction with
the other great powers, of existing international borders within
the area (see below).
The second measure recommended is an agreement among the exter-
nal suppliers to keep arms in the area at existing levels, both
quantitatively and qualitatively. This measure requires two important
preconditions: a guarantee of existing international borders within
the area, and removal of foreign troops and bases from affected
portions thereof. The suppliers would have to include not only the
great powers but additional countries in both Eastern and Western
Europe. As indicated later, there might be great merit--including
the merit of increased acceptability--if both the non-proliferation
declaration and the arms freeze, along with the provision for IAEA
safeguards, were part of a larger scheme embracing North and sub-
Saharan Africa as well.
(2) The achievement of such a step requires recognition of
common interests between the United States and Soviet Union that go
considerably beyond their present relationship. Nevertheless its
urgency in view of the accelerated UAR-Israeli arms race gives high
priority to U.S. efforts to impress the Soviet Union and also
Britain, France, and other suppliers with the importance it attaches
to these moves.
While there is no attempt here to specify the elements of
possible diplomatic bargains involved in achieving the measures
suggested, the possibility is flagged of a future trade-off between
Soviet agreement to abstain from intervention in the Middle East
and, to give two examples only, possible reduction of the U.S.
military presence in Iran and Turkey in a way that protects U.S.
interests, and a possible post-colonial solution for presently
British-controlled Aden and South Arabia.
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D. North Africa
1. Political and Strategic Basis for Arms Control
At the present time, the four North African states of Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya pose a problem more like that of sub-
Saharan Africa than that of the Middle East. Geographically and
politically, they are remote from the passions and problems of both
areas, although through their common Arab culture and outlook they
are linked with the Middle Eastern Arab states and are active
members of the Organization of African Unity. There are no arms
races in North Africa: arms expenditures are modest, and the arms
of the four states are in rough balance with each other. At the
same time, there are negative forces at work--North African involve-
ment in the affairs of the Middle East through the Arab League,
Egyptian ambitions in Libya, Algerian-Moroccan rivalries, Algerian
pretentions to military adventures in sub-Saharan Africa in the
name of African unity, and Moroccan claims to Mauritania. Out of
any of these issues, or others like them, an arms race could develop
and North Africa could go critical.
General U.S. political interests in North Africa must be viewed
in the larger context of U.S.-Western European relations, particularly
U.S.-French relations, since France remains the most involved, inter-
ested, and influential foreign power in the region.
For the present there is no urgency for arms control measures
in the area as there is in the Middle East, and from the point of
view of U.S. policy planning North African arms control might best
be regarded in the light of a broader approach to either the Middle
Eastern or, more profitably, the sub-Saharan region. At the same
time, in view of the potential dangers of disputes within the area
taking the form of arms competition, contingent plans for regional
controls specifically tailored to North Africa should be developed.
As in Latin America, but unlike the Middle East, there are
important initiatives that statesmen in North Africa can themselves
take with profit to their own countries and to regional and world
peace. These could relate either just to the North African area,
or to Africa as a whole.
2. Recommended Action
a. Indigenous Agreements. The states of North Africa should be
encouraged to take the initiative along the following lines in
averting a future arms race among themselves:
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(1) Formal renunciation by the countries of North Africa of
the right to manufacture, receive, or include among national armaments
nuclear weapons, CBR weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction,
whether the manufacture, storing, or testing of weapons, or devices
to launch them.
(2) Prohibition by the countries of North Africa of all
forms of weapons commonly considered to be sophisticated and offen-
sive in nature and irrelevant to their internal security needs.
As suggested with respect to Latin America, and with the same
caveats, examples of prohibited weapons might include: medium,
intermediate, and long-range missiles with precision guidance,
whether surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, or air-to-surface;
jet-powered aircraft other than fighters; heavy tanks; mobile
artillery; and large warships such as aircraft carriers and
cruisers; and submarines.
(3) Adoption of the policy that national armed forces are
to be used for internal security only, with appropriate specific
limitations as listed with respect to Latin America.
b. United States Policy
(1) As was recommended with respect to the Middle East, the
United States should seek international agreement aimed at the pre-
vention of dissemination of nuclear weapons. France may be as
unwilling to join such an effort as it is to agree to a test ban;
nonetheless, the agreement should be sought in the hope that an
isolated France (and China) will eventually be persuaded to join it.
(2) As with the Middle East, the United States should seek
an agreement among major suppliers of arms that they will not provide
to the countries in question sophisticated, offensive, or other
weapons not needed for internal security.
E. Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Political and Strategic Basis for Arms Control
- Africa south of the Sahara, like Latin America and North Africa,
defines its security needs in terms of internal disorders, threats of
insurgency, and wars below the level commonly denominated as limited.
Like Latin America and the Middle East, it conceives its security in
terms of an enemy presence in the region--in this case the complex
of white and/or colonial territories in the south. Unlike Latin
America, there is no single power that guarantees against major
intra-regional conflict; for an indeterminate period ahead the
capacity of the former metropoles to intervene will provide the pri-
mary counterweight to regional instability.
The over-riding U.S. interest in the region derives from broad
national policy purposes rather than from special strategic concerns.
These broad purposes include a preference for stability in regions
outside direct Cold War involvement; a clear interest in nipping arms
competitions in the bud before the multiple quarrels of small states
entangle the superpowers in wars not of their choosing; and an urgent
U.S. interest in a peaceful and viable solution to the southern
African complex of problems. In terms of its goals and interests,
the United States has nothing to fear from a truly nonaligned Africa.
A form of tacit arms control already is practiced in sub-
Saharan Africa. Lacking indigenous arms industries, the countries
of the area are dependent on external suppliers--principally Western--
who have refused to supply advanced types of armaments. Exceptions
to this tacit control system are the Republic of South Africa with
its growing arms industry, and recently increased Soviet and/or
Chinese assistance to disaffected or expansionist African states.
Since continued arming of sub-Saharan Africa beyond certain levels,
even for internal security purposes, could trigger local arms
races, it is in the U.S. interest to encourage steps to prevent
suct an outcome. Because of the nature of sub-Saharan African
security needs and the low level, quantitatively and qualitatively,
of their arms, many of the familiar forms of arms control would be
inappropriate. Furthermore, no measure is likely to be acceptible
if it appears to discriminate against black Africa vis-a-vis
southern Africa.
Clearly two things must happen before arms control in sub-
Saharan Africa is thinkable as a policy. First, as in Latin
America, collective security measures in sub-Saharan Africa must
become sufficiently predictable and reliable that all states
believe protection to be afforded against major external attack
and, to the extent possible, against indirect aggression and
subversion. Second, so long as African nationalists see no
alternative to offsetting the vastly superior armed strength of
the white areas of the south other than aid from the Communist
countries, the United States will be in no position to influence
developments in what could be the most portentous racial struggle
of the epoch. A precondition for effective arms control
policies is a U.S. decision to develop far more active relations
with African nationalist movements and non-Communist leaders in
the three sets of areas, and, through appropriate direct and
indirect means, to extend economic and military aid of a type
that falls within the scope of the following proposals.
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2. Recommended Action
a. Indigenous Agreements. Within the framework of the political
imperatives referred to earlier, the independent states of sub-Saharan
Africa should be encouraged to take the initiative, preferably through
a strengthened OAU, to avert a future arms race by:
(1) Formally renouncing the right to manufacture, receive,
or include among national armaments nuclear, CBR, and other weapons
of mass destruction.
(2) Prohibiting among themselves all forms of weapons com-
monly considered to be sophisticated and offensive in nature including
the categories and sub-categories of missiles, aircraft, and warships
listed for illustrative purposes earlier.
(3) Adoption of the policy that armed forces are to be used
for internal security purposes only, with appropriate limitations
as specified earlier.
b. United States Policy
(1) With sub-Saharan Africa, as with all the other regions,
the United States should seek international agreement now to keep
nuclear weapons and their components out of sub-Saharan Africa, as
well as an agreement among major suppliers of arms that they will not
provide to the countries in question sophisticated, offensive, or
otherwise prohibited conventional weapons systems.
(2) The United States should as a matter of policy encourage
in every way feasible the evolution and strengthening of OAU as a
regional security system increasingly able to take on responsibilities
for negotiating, administering, and enforcing within the region
political and military programs for both the pacific settlement of
intra-regional disputes and collective security.
F. Special Recommendations
1. Possible Small Zones of Disarmament
In the course of this study several possible candidates have
emerged for local (i.e. less-than-regional) arms control or dis-
armament. While the detailed elaboration of possible regimes of
inspection and administration for these small zones is beyond the
scope of the present study, we would flag the following sub-regional
areas as perhaps useful for gaining experience with techniques of
arms control, specifically techniques of inspection:
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a. Central America. Some Latin American countries are so remote
from some others, and the terrain that separates from each the
effectively occupied parts of many of them is so unsuitable for
military operations, that there are instances in which limitations
can be accepted by some of the states without increasing the
threat to their security from any of the states that do not accept
the limitation. The small countries of Central America provide one
example.
Supporting this notion is the historical background of efforts
by some or all of the countries of Central America to develop an arms
control regime among themselves. In 1906 San Salvador (now El
Salvador), Honduras, and Guatemala agreed to reduce their military
strength. In 1923 the Central American republics went further,
adopting a Convention on the Limitation of Armaments that fixed
maximum military strength on the basis of "population, area, length
of frontier...." Recent efforts by the Central American nations
to act jointly in a variety of fields suggest that the idea of a
new sub-regional agreement might be worth pursuing.
b. Middle East. Israel and its Arab neighbors have in recent
years been treated for crisis management purposes as though
constituting a separate sub-region; some of these efforts speci-
fically included measures that could properly be called "arms
control."
The United Nations Security Council, in its first major
resolution concerning a truce in the 1947-48 Palestine war, called
on the parties inter alia to "refrain from importing or acquiring
or assisting or encouraging 1the importation or acquisition of
weapons and war materials." On May 29 the Council, appealing for
a four-week cessation of all acts of armed force in Palestine,
called on all Governments and authorities concerned to undertake
that they would not introduce "fighting personnel" or "war
material" into "Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Sa'udi Arabia,
Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen."2 Eight years later the United
Nations General Assembly in its Emergency Special Session on the
Suez Crisis recommended to all Member States that they "refrain
from introducing military goods into the area of hostilities." 3
Other U.S. suggestions for restraints on the flow of arms and
1Adopted by the Security Council at its meeting of April
17, 1948.
2Security Council Doc.S/801, May 29, 1948.
UNGA Resolution 997 (ES-I), November 2, 1956.
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materiel into the area have been discussed both privately and
publicly, and the matter could arise again on short notice in another
crisis.
A sub-regional approach of a rather different sort is the pos-
sibility of demilitarization of the West Bank of the Jordan River.
Israel has repeatedly stated that it must retain freedom of action
in the event of any large-scale movement of troops and military
equipment into Jordan, because an attack launched from Jordan could
inflict irreparable damage on Israel before the powers or the UN
could react. Since any such attack would necessitate the prelim-
inary movement of men and equipment across the Jordan River, the
establishment of the West Bank as a demilitarized zone would
probably mitigate Israeli apprehension. If the great powers are
able to reach agreement on arms limitations for the Middle East
generally, they could doubtless also devise a means, either among
themselves or through the United Nations, whereby such a
demilitarized status for the West Bank could be controlled.
c. Sub-Saharan Africa, Several possible small zones of inspec-
tion and arms control in sub-Saharan Africa might be feasible. First,
the potential arms rivalry between Ghana and Nigeria could under
some circumstances lend itself to a local arms control arrangement.
Inspection of the armies of these two countries in terms of time
sequences would reveal any significant shifts indicative of an
arms race. Such inspection could mainly be confined to budget
analysis and to evaluation of plans for future military growth,
with standards established indicating when military expansion by
one side was occurring in response to military expansion by the
other. It should be noted, however, that controls of this type
could actually increase tension by raising the rivalry in question
to the level of a dispute.
Second is a rather different type of "small zone" inspection,
with the cases in question Zanzibar and the border area of Rwanda.
The problem here is subversive activity, by its very nature the
problem least susceptible to inspection; nevertheless these two
areas might provide experience about the ways in which information
can be gathered concerning such activity.
Detection of Communist efforts to use Zanzibar as a base for
infiltration into East Africa would require a census and on-site
inspection of ship movements from Zanzibar to the mainland in order
to control arms shipments, as well as the movement of persons from
Zanzibar into East Africa. Such inspection would certainly include
large shipments from the Communist states to Zanzibar. This
inspection could be carried out by the states of East Africa
themselves, by OAU or the United Nations, or by African states
from outside the area of East Africa. The recent federation of
Zanzibar with Tanganyika may make inspection by officials from
Tanganyika itself feasible.
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Effective inspection of the boider area of Rwanda could provide
information concerning the movement of refugees and the kinds of small-
scale violations arms-control agreements in Africa would be most
likely to face. This type of inspection could include both air
inspection of movement of large groups, and on-site inspection. It
could be carried out by QAU, the United Nations, or the states in
which the refugees are found; in all cases, inspection for this
purpose would require the cooperation of the states concerned.
These states could also provide certain census material on refugee
groups and knowledge of their whereabouts and activities. Clearly
this effort would also have to include inspection within Rwanda
itself concerning the actions and movements of the Rwanda armed
forces.
Finally, as the only serious border problem presently facing
sub-Saharan African leaders, the Somali dispute with Ethiopia and
Kenya provides a case study of the relevance of arms control
measures to the region. For the purpose of controlling such
measures, two types of inspection would be feasible. Zonal
inspection could, with the consent of the countries concerned,
give evidence to the outside countries or the United Nations as
to whether or not accepted arms control policies and/or agreements
were being adhered to. By furnishing evidence as to developments
in the border regions, they would contribute to further arms
control prospects in the area. At present such inspection on a
periodic basis would be adequate; it should, however, be capable
of being rapidly increased in times of special tension. For this
purpose a roving team of inspectors would be required. It could
be composed of neutrals, OAU, or United Nations contingents. While
such inspection efforts would have to be carried out under a formal
agreement, they could also be applied to various kinds of tacit
or informal measures.
2. The Role of International Organizations
The regional organizations that exist at present in Latin
America, the Middle East, and Africa are, among other things,
coalitions or "alliances" whose "objects" lie within the same
geographic regions. It is therefore unlikely that the existing
organizations could become appropriate instrumentalities for
achieving or administering arms control agreements that included
both their own memberships and the states against which they are
allied.
As regional peacekeeping organizations, the records of the
regional organizations are mixed. The Organization of American
States has been effective in dealing with low-level inter-American
disputes; OAS was not called upon to deal with a major threat to
the peace arising exclusively within the hemisphere until the
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recent Cuban-Venezuelan dispute. Some of the major Latin American
states appear to differ with the United States as to what constitutes
extra-hemispheric intervention and a threat to regional peace. The
Arab League is too internally divided to be effective among its
membership, and too committed in the Arab-Israeli dispute to play a
centa-l role either in regional peacekeeping or in regional arms
control. CENTO's chief role is defined in Cold War terms rather than
in terms of regional peacekeeping. The Organization of African Unity
had a promising initial year, but it is too early to reach any con-
clusions about its long-range potential. Administratively, all the
regional organizations are weak.
The role of the United Nations in regional disarmament is
likely to be crucial, just as its role in regional peacekeeping to
date (with the exception of Latin America) has been crucial. At the
moment, the United Nations is the only international organization
capable of dealing with the problems raised at the outset of the
relationship of regional alliances to their regional objects. In
this role, the United Nations may find itself in a position of
opposition to the regional organizations. However, there is also
a cooperative role that the United Nations can play in regional arms
control agreements--the role of guarantor, or of umbrella under which
regional agreements may be possible. In this latter role the possi-
bility of the United Nations utilizing the regional organizations as
its agents in certain circumstances needs to be given more detailed
analysis. The United Nations may also find itself called upon to
play a role in disputes between regional systems.
a. Recommendations
(1) The only regional system in which the United States is
in a position to have a direct influence is OAS. The United States
should make every effort to strengthen the administrative capacity of
the organization, by ensuring that it has adequate resources, by
encouraging the assignment to it of tasks that will give it
administrative experience and increase respect for it among Latin
American states, and by examining whether the location of some of its
major activities in capitals other than Washington would not allay
some Latin American fears that the secretariat is under U.S.
domination.
(2) While there are no such direct steps that the United States
could take to increase the capacities of the other regional organiza-
tions, there are measures that might be useful. Particularly with the
Organization of African Unity, the provision of assistance from the
OAS secretariat in establishing its offices and procedures might be
very valuable for both organizations. In addition, the techniques
developed by OAS for handling low-level inter-American disputes may
be applicable in the OAU region as well. The United States could
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direct some of its administrative training programs specifically to
training OAU personnel and encourage the United Nations to do the same.
(3) Finally, there is an urgent need for the United States
to examine the complex of issues that are involved in the relationship
between the regional and the global anproaches to security. Such re-
evaluation of regional security vis-a-vis global security should be
in terms of both changing strategic and political environments and in
terms of the relative roles and capabilities of regional and global
security organizations for the tasks of peacekeeping including those
arising out of arms control agreement. To date, all U.S. experience
has been with relationships between the United Nations and OAS, where
historical, geographic, and other conditions apply that do not apply
in Africa. A re-examination of the United Nations-regional organization
relationship in a broader than OAS context, particularly with reference
to the manner in which U.S. policy objectives can be achieved without
destabilizing regional systems, would do much to anticipate and even
avoid future problems.
G. The Question of a Common United States Policy
I- The Basis for a Common Policy
Obvious differences among the regions have been made apparent in
the study. But certain common features have also emerged. Some of
them make more difficult the development of a common U.S. policy
toward arms control.
Perhaps the most striking similarity among all but one of our
regions is the existence of a malignant dispute that, like any cancer-
ous growth, drastically reduces the chances for political health for
the body politic as far as one can see into the near future. Cuba
in Latin America, the "white redoubt" problem in southern Africa, and
the Palestine issue in the Middle East--plus, some would argue, the
Ethiopian-Somalian-Kenyan dispute in the Horn of Africa--all these,
like the essential struggles between the United States and the Soviet
Union over Germany, Eastern Europe, Berlin, and the very structuring
of the political future, confound the most imaginatively-drawn plans
for ameliorating the arms races in question.
Like the planners of great power arms control, we have sought to
"design around" these obvious obstacles. But there is no assurance
that if they did not exist or could be made magically to disappear,
arms control measures would even then be acceptable. Perhaps if they
did not exist arms control measures might not be as important as we
believe they are now. But as it is, there are built-in dynamics to
regional quarrels and threats which bode ill for the future unless
steps are taken to control the process. The very impetus to arm
against a third party can itself engender a new and dangerous bilateral
arms race--as witness the case of India and Pakistan.
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Moreover, there is a signal difference between the key obstacles
mentioned. Latin America lives under a potent guarantee of U.S. power,
and could even disarm under that umbrella. But the various objectives
of armament for black Africa are pursued in the absence of any such
firm commitment from a great power. We are suggesting for the Middle
East a new great power guarantee, and for all regions a more predictable
security system based on a combination of regional organizations, the
United Nations, and U.S. power.
Another potential obstacle to a common approach lies in the
external orientation of each of the regions. Latin America has a
special, almost exclusive relationship to the United States, mitigated
only by Cuba's present unholy attachment to the Communist bloc,
France's efforts to effect a political and economic beachhead, and
traditional ties of sentiment and culture to Spain and Portugal.
And Africa, both north and south of the Sahara, has a special relation-
ship with former metropoles, notably the United Kingdom, France,
and Belgium.
In the Middle East, of course, apart from Israel's intimate
relations with the United States, the Arab states can no longer be
said to relate signally to any single outside source. But Turkey
and Iran have called for separate treatment throughout this analysis
precisely because of their special alliance relationships with the
United States and Western Europe. This situation could of course
change with shifting strategic concepts and arrangements. Iran, for
example, could "go neutralist" and become part of a larger neutralist
bloc in the Middle East and South Asia which in turn might lend itself
to a single framework of arms control.
Other connections between the regions suggest at least certain
cautions that ought to be observed in any attempts to develop a
broader arms control policy for underdeveloped regions generally.
One caution stems from the highly sensitive relationship between two
of the regions--the Middle East and North Africa. While a package
approach to arms control in the Middle East and North Africa may
have a superficial attractiveness, in fact the situations are so
widely different that a single policy scheme linking the two might
be subject to fatal stresses. At the same time, to the extent that
any Middle East arms control scheme involved members of the Arab
League, all four North African states would of necessity be associated.
Furthermore, the proposed arms freeze for the Middle East would be
better applied to the whole Arab world plus sub-Saharan Africa. And
any arrangements for controlling arms with respect to North Africa
might possibly serve as a form of leverage to enhance a Middle Eastern
settlement. But it could be very counter-productive politically to
seek to use North African arrangements as a means of pressuring the
Middle Eastern countries. Finally, we do not believe it would serve
either United States interests or the prospects for regional stability
if, through arms control negotiations, significantly increased partici-
pation of North Africa in the affairs of the Middle East were to be
encouraged.
However, in the relationship between North and sub-Saharan Africa
it might be highly desirable to take a common approach. One can envisage
important arms control steps, at least in principle, as being initiated
internally in the region by the countries themselves. A common politi-
cal framework already links them, at least embryonically (one which has
already employed sub-Saharan personnel to mediate a North African
dispute). The OAU umbrella might now be opened still further over the
continent as a whole, always excepting the UAR whose orientation is
preponderantly eastward. And the UAR would be included in some of the
measures we have suggested, notably the preservation of the continent
as a nuclear-free zone, U.S. policy could well aim at the controlled
limitation of all arms to and in both North Africa and sub-Saharan
Africa, and if the UAR must be exempted from some of the measures in
question this does not derogate from the desirability and even urgency
of constructive steps with regard to the other two regions.
In this connection, while acknowledging the genuine impossibility
of agreements at the present time between Arabs and Israelis concerning
virtually any subject and most particularly their security, the United
States and other great powers might well utilize the territorial
guarantees we have recommended as inducements for Israel and Egypt, as
well as others in the area, unilaterally to renounce nuclear weapons
in much the same fasion as in other regions it would be done multi-
laterally.
Finally, while in three of the four regions it was concluded that
steps of useful and significant arms control could and should be taken
by the countries thereof, in the Middle East this is impossible. There
the primary initiative must come from without. Indeed, while there
would be obvious value in the various initiatives being taken jointly
or at least simultaneously, that may not be possible; the arrangements
recommended then should be sought region by region, looking to the
time when all others follow the lead of those who have been statesman-
like in showing the way.
If regional arms control were to be sought region-by-region, what
would be the criteria by which the U.S. would make choices? Obviously,
one criterion would be the priority assigned on the basis of U.S.
interests, which might in turn rest on appraisal of the degree of
short-term threat to the peace. Another criterion would surely be
the extent of U.S. influence in stimulating regional action. In terms
of threats to the peace for which arms control would be a remedy, the
Middle East probably has top priority, given its potential for
escalation to nuclear capabilities. But U.S. influence may be least
strong there. The chances for aborting a regional arms race may be
greatest in sub-Saharan Africa, where arms levels are relatively lowest.
But U.S. influence may be more easily applied in Latin America.
In general, the wisest course would probably be a broad-spectrum
approach in which no particular region seemed to be singled out, and in
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which universally applicable principles and measures constituted the
basis of U.S. policy. Perhaps the most important single reinforcement
of the regional approach recommended here would be evidence that the
great powers were pursuing with equal vigor measures of arms control
applicable to themselves.
2. A Broad Policy for the United States
Except for the Middle East, perhaps the most interesting thing
about the regions in question is the early stage the countries are at
in anything that might be called an arms "race." If a junior-size, full-
scale arms competition is on between Egypt and Israel, and, in a
different sense, within Cuba, what is happening in North Africa, sub-
Saharan Africa, and the rest of Latin America can perhaps be described
as "arms walks." Indeed, we may profitably think of at least sub-
Saharan Africa as the "outer space" of regional arms control, in that
it is not yet militarized, many kinds of temptations exist for changing
the situation--and no one is quite certain that the Soviet Union has not
in fact started the race unilaterally.
It has been said fairly often over the past fifteen years that
the great power arms race has "passed the point of no return." Each
time the point was newly passed, however, the chances for some kinds
of arms control may have in fact improved, on the theory that the
seriousness of arms control negotiations is a function of how frightened
people really are. It may be more difficult or less difficult to abort
a field of growth before it develops; historical evidence is virtually
non-existent and one must be at least sobered by the hazards of action
in an area so replete with symbols of sovereignty, adulthood, virility,
and pride, as is the matter of arms for new, small, or poor countries.
And yet unless one believes with orthodox Marxists in the pre-
ordination and inevitability of historical trends, the obligation
remains to search for feasible means of altering the tide of events.
To be constructive, one must be realistic: perhaps if the Baruch Plan
of 1945 had not been so politically utopian the nuclear arms race
could have been aborted--perhaps not. Certainly in some instances,
notably the Middle East, we have discarded any policy idea that
depends on intra-regional cooperation. But in other areas we think
it reasonable to urge action.
It is thus recommended that the following overall U.S. policies
be considered for adoption, in addition to the separate programs of
regional arms control outlined earlier. We believe that these common
policies could with profit to all be applied globally, including the
Middle East:
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a. To take action, through the seeking of formal agreements by
nuclear powers and then all other states, for the prevention of the
further spread of nuclear weapons, CBR weapons, and other weapons of
mass destruction, including the manufacture, storing, or testing of
weapons, and the devices to launch them.
In this study we have formulated for the regions in question
proposals toward this end that take the form, first of all, of
indigenous agreements renouncing the right of the countries in question
to manufacture, receive, or include among national armaments nuclear
weapons, CBR weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction. But we
have not thereby automatically advocated the "nuclear-free" zone so
popular in Soviet forensics. We have been careful nowhere among our
recommendations to suggest that the United States ought to forego the
right to use nuclear weapons in extremis, or the right to transfer
and deploy such weapons, notably in the Western Hemisphere. But our
omission is without prejudice to the possibility that in making its
larger strategic and political calculations the United States may
decide thatto prevent dissemination to others, it must consider
restrictions for itself regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons
on the territory of other states in "peacetime." In fact, it may not
be possible to press other countries to renounce nuclear weapons with-
out subscribing at least to the concept commonly implied by the label
of "nuclear free zone." (The issue of'Tirst use'is clearly a separate
one and is not dealt with here.)
The United States must decide with greater finality than it has up
to now just how great importance it attaches to its anti-proliferation
policy, and how much it would be willing to do in order to press it.
The relationship to the European problem is unavoidable. Without
entering into the debate, we believe that if the French decision to
create a nuclear force made less feasible a comprehensive agreement
among the great powers to rebottle the nuclear djinn, the NLF may in
fact make it even more difficult, at least in the short run.
This crucial policy issue to the side, if the United States can
see its way clear to seeking some or all of the agreements recommended
here it will be necessary to provide adequate controls. If inter-
national inspection could be agreed to, including such overflight and
on-site surveillance as is required, U.S. security needs would be met.
Realistically, this is unlikely, and considerable reliance would
probably have to be placed on the unilateral capabilities of U.S. and
other national intelligence; in whatever combination, the aim of
inspection would be to pick up with a reasonably high degree of
confidence any development of significant strategic delivery capabil-
ities before it could become an area--let alone a world-wide--threat.
What the United States could not favor would be prohibitions on
unilateral overflight or outer space surveillance in the absence of
effective international machinery.
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The principal difficulty might well lie in the relatively rapid
quantitative spread of nuclear reactors for research or power production.
As we have indicated at several places, it is logical to have the inspec-
tion and reporting standards and procedures of the International Atomic
Energy Agency applied to such agreements, and the policy corollary for
the United States Government is a determined effort to improve and enlarge
the writ of the IAEA.
One can only speculate upon the lengths to which the Soviet Union
would be willing to go to staunch the potential spread of nuclear
weapons technology. It abstained on the 1963 United Nations resolution
regarding a Latin American nuclear-free zone. On other occasions,
however, it has expressed readiness to seek agreements to this end.
To the extent that overseas U.S. air bases in the developing
countries have been created primarily as forward echelons of the
Strategic Air Command, the issue of bases is inescapably related to
the issue of a non-dissemination policy. Some of the recommendations
in this report have implied the possibility of trading off Western
bases in the Middle East and North Africa if sufficient inducement is
offered in return. Without wishing to enter into that complex 'ssue
in detail, it would be consistent with a changing U.S. strategic
doctrine that increasingly sees mobile sea-based, undersea, and
continental missile power as preferable to overseas bases. This
has of course been reinforced by evidence of the politically
corrosive effect on the Western political position such bases may
have locally. Another point is that, while it would be reassuring
to keep all such bases indefinitely, the fact is that the trend is
steadily to liquidate them and it would be pleasant--just once--to
be able to utilize base closings as bargaining counters for some-
thing the United States wants before withdrawal is announced. It
is at least arguable that, while fully recognizing the reasons Afor
the forward deployment of United States--and other--forces,
particularly the U.S. military presence in Europe under present
circumstances, at bottom political relationships will not be
thoroughly sound until military forces of all countries--the United
States, Soviet Union, Britain, Egypt, Indonesia, North Vietnam, etc.--
are once more stationed within their own national boundaries.
Whether or not it becomes possible to negotiate a meaningful
agreement on the subject of bases, it would seem incumbent upon U.S.
planners to consider that it might be worth taking even unpleasant
steps to press actively and operationally with an anti-proliferation
policy, in the light of the possibly mortal hazards that will
characterize a world in which nuclear weapons proliferate widely.
When one considers the predictably dramatic drop in the cost of
producing such weapons in the relatively near future, it is clear
why the seeming lull today is illusory. There can be only one
path for statesmanship here.
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b. The second broad United States policy which we have recommended
be applied consistently in all regions is to seek formal or informal
undertakings among the suppliers of weapons to the countries concerned
that they will not provide any arms other than those legitimately required
for internal security needs. This would bar the sale or transfer of
weapons that are commonly understood to be sophisticated, offensive, or
expensive, and we have suggested a possible list of both prohibited and
permitted weapons.
Such a step, except in the case of the Middle East, would best be
taken in conjunction with the initiatives for self-denying ordinances
along these lines that we have suggested ought to be taken within the
regions. However, even if no such indigenous initiatives prove possible,
we would argue that U.S. (and Soviet and other great power) interests
urgently require that such steps be taken as lie within the power of
responsible outside states, to put a stop to the competitive build-up of
arms in these regions to the extent such build-up results from external
supply. This step would go a long way toward aborting the still
embryonic arms races in developing areas.
It is fully recognized that if such an agreement were reached, the
interpretations of "internal security needs" may vary grossly (as they
will if GCD ever comes closer.) The United States might well interpret
"internal security" as comprehending defense and support of a legitimate
government, perhaps even in some cases where such a government may have
lost popular support; and the Soviets would doubtless interpret it in the
light of a revolutionary doctrine according to which externally-stimulated
insurgencies are "wars of liberation" for the internal security of the
"people"--in many cases the people being hard-core Communist cadres. One
can only repeat here the importance of developing better objective
standards for doctrine both as to force levels and military hardware.
Divergent interpretations on any topic are going to inhere in any
agreements between East and West for some time ahead. These are reflec-
tions of profound and well-known ideological differences. In the present
matter, as in other realms of policy, where it seems possible to move
the larger struggle to less dangerous and more acceptable levels, we
would hold that it is in the interests of the United States to pursue
limited and well-defined agreements. An agreement of the sort
recommended should be entered into with one's eyes wide open, and in
the realization that special responsibility attaches to the United States
to take the lead in measures that are so clearly in everyone's interest,
even though others may not have the wit to realize it.
The inspection of a generalized agreement, formal or tacit, not
to supply arms in excess of internal security needs is possible only
through circumstantial evidence; but the evidence of acquisition of
wholly inappropriate arms by small or poor countries can scarcely be
hidden. We can see no satisfactory punitive device available for
infractions. If the agreement is widely violated, it probably is not
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recognizably in the common interests of the powers to continue it and
it had better be abandoned.
One thing that can be done is to revive the most useful practice
of the League of Nations in widely publicizing statistics and other
facts about the arms trade. Communications have improved considerably
since the inter-war period; there might be few better sanctions than
continuous publicity about arms races in places where they do not belong.
3. Regional Arms Control and International Security
The relationship between "disarmament" and "security" is one
which has plagued the world since 1945, and before that all through
the period of the League of Nations. We are not proposing total
disarmament here, either in the sense of world-wide disarmament, or in
the sense of total disarmament of the smaller powers. But we are
proposing for some countries denial in part of a normally legitimate
guarantor of national security; we are recommending for all countries
a ceiling on their armed forces, and for many a reduction in present
strength (although a surprising number might have to build up
capabilities to reach the ceiling). In each case the question of
security is bound to arise; in three of the four regions the focus of
security concerns represents a very real and even grave threat to
peace and security in the area.
The effect of great power disarmament might be to exacerbate
their problem. Particularly in sub-Saharan and North Africa the
greater the degree of disarmament by the great powers, the greater
the likelihQod of uncontrollable instability among the countries of
the region. The basic implication of this is that, apart from what
the United Nations can do, the military forces of the United States
and Great Britain, and to a lesser extent of France (and in a different
way of Belgium, Portugal, and Spain) represent the only effective
external power that can be invoked by the area governments today to
aid them in preserving internal order and stability.
The need for such forces of intervention has been frequently
demonstrated in recent times, notably in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g.,
the Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, etc.). In the years
ahead there will undoubtedly be efforts to build up both regional
and United Nations forces for this purpose. What we are suggesting
is a program of intensive efforts further to strengthen regional
organizations such as OAU and OAS, first of all to sponsor the
arrangements proposed here and, second, to help fill whatever
vacuums of confidence and of power may be created. We would go
beyond that to urge a reconsideration of the whole concept of
regional security embodied in Chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter. The world envisaged in Chapter VIII might be surprisingly
congenial to the United States in the last third of the twentieth
century.
None of this diminishes in any way the importance of the United
Nations, both as the primary forum for the pacific settlement of inter-
national disputes and, in many cases, the prime agency for carrying out
the tasks of peacekeeping that range from the ameliorative and preventive
roles of observation and patrol to the real collective security function
of opposing or repelling armed aggression. The UN has obvious and
unique value in dealing with inter-regional and larger-than-regional
matters, including those arising out of regional arms control. The
indivisibility of security has also come to mean that thermonuclear
war is threatened when local disputes reach a flash point, and this
reality tends to overshadow any abstraction about universal involve-
ment. Thus, just as United Nations forces have adopted the practice of
using troops of small rather than large powers, so it is desirable to
plan arms control-security mechanisms in a way that de-escalates and
minimizes the chances of great power collision.
The United Nations and regional security organizations are all
relevant to filling gaps left in the security structure of the regions
by limitations on their arms. But it should be clearly understood that
in fact we have nowhere recommended that which is commonly understood
as "disarmament," in the sense of stripping away from these countries
such armaments as they now have, as GCD would do over several stages.
Our emphasis is upon where we go from here in these areas rather
than on undoing previous developments. We are suggesting arms control
techniques for the purpose of shaping the future rather than
disarmament for dismantling or rectifying the past.
The relevance of a certain minimum level of national armed forces
in the security equation is underscored by the fact that when it comes
to guarantees that the countries concerned will not be left even
relatively defenseless in any regional arms limitation agreement, the
final ingredient in the security picture, particularly in Latin
America, is the power of the United States, the belief that such power
will be used only in the service of justice, and the confidence that
it will in fact back up a security guarantee, whether made under the
United Nations, through a regional organization, or unilaterally.
(As a nonparticipant in the Middle East the United States might in
a different but related way find that its own power can also supply
the principal backing for a new guarantee of the peace, as a
concomitant of externally-initiated arms control.)
For in the end, U.S. power must continue to serve the cause of
world peace as far ahead as we can see. Even if important arms control
measures come to be adopted by the United States this will still be true.
Certainly in Latin America it will remain of paramount importance for
U.S. conventional power to be available to reinforce arms limitation
measures agreed to by others. It may be no less true elsewhere.
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Global total disarmament remains a utopian objective. Even
universally-applicable arms control may be too much to hope for at the
present. But the steps we have outlined for regional arms control, many
of which lie within the present capacity of a few nations to execute,
rank in our judgment very close to the urgently needed measures of arms
limitation among the great -powers as the most feasible and practicable
policy steps for this country to take now in the arms field. They give
one more reason--and perhaps the most under-valued one of all--for the
United States to settle upon an overall arms control and disarmament
policy that conforms to the realities of the times, in terms of urgent
steps to reverse the course of events, in terms of a believable position
on less-than-total disarmament, and in terms of the need as far as one
can foresee to rely upon United States national power to lend confidence
to a world still without trust.
